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A REPLY TO FORMER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY,
WILLIAM E. SIMON: TOWARDS A THEORY OF A
PARTICIPATORY SOCIETY
Lewis D. Solomon*
"We have come into a very unusual period, where we are more
or less cast loose from beliefs that we once held to be unarguable.
We have cast off from a large number of these old moorings, and we
have not yet found new ones."
Former Secretary of the Treasury George Shultz, as quoted in
Fortune, January 1974, at 61.
I. Introduction
In the July 1976 issue of this review, William E. Simon, former Secretary
of the Treasury, presented a rebuttal to an article on capital shortages, tax policy
and economic planning which had appeared in the December 1975 issue of the
Notre Dame Lawyer.' In attacking a proposal for credit allocation by the fed-
eral government, Mr. Simon maintained that primary reliance should be placed
on the market mechanism in regulating the economy. The thesis of Mr. Simon's
position is that in the absence of direct government intervention, a market-
directed economic system will function as well as, if not better than, any alter-
native economic system. This reply challenges the supposed efficacy of the
market system, while attempting to highlight some of the problems entailed in
governmental regulation and planning in such areas as credit allocation. In ad-
dition, the prospect for a shift in values that could produce a far-reaching re-
structuring of our economic and political institutions is assessed.
II. Defects in the Market System
The free market encompasses the ideology of individualism, namely, that
self-interest can yield social benefits, and that competition, efficiency, and
productivity can yield a higher return for firms at a lower cost. The autonomous
market mechanism, it is posited, can meet society's needs for goods and services
without the use of authority, power, or influence by the state. In such a system
the government would serve as an umpire with the primary responsibility of
seeing that the participants observe the rules of the game.
However, the free market encounters the following problems: (1) economic
and social instability characterized by frequent and painful economic dislocation;
(2) power imbalances emanating from a dual economic system; (3) fabrication
of consumer preferences; (4) environmental degradation and resource deple-
tion; and (5) neglect of human and social needs.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City Law School; B.A.,
Cornell University 1963; J.D., Yale Law School 1966.
1 Solomon & Belzer, Looking Ahead: Capital Shortages, Tax Policy, and Economic
Planning, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 251 (1975); Simon, Rebuttal: Credit Allocation: Panacea or
Problem? 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 974 (1976).
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The political system of the invisible hand, which protected and permitted
private producers of goods and services to fulfill consumer needs, led, in large
measure, to the crisis of over-production and mass unemployment in 1932. The
Great Depresssion is evidence of the inability of the market to act as a self-adjust-
ing, naturally beneficent system. Deficiencies in collective consumption gave rise
to unused human and physical capacities.
In an attempt to "control" alternating boom and bust business cycles, the
United States turned to a variety of fiscal and monetary tools to rescue the
system from its depressed economic conditions, to prop up demand for goods and
services produced by the private sector, and to promote increased material wealth
and economic growth. The political economy of the United States has thus
evolved over the last forty-five years into a maze of regulations, subsidies, indirect
incentives, and outright bailouts which attempt to insure mass purchasing power
and lessen risks in those sectors of the economy that might cause widespread
dislocation. All the while, American business sought new frontiers in the world
economic system which demanded a substantial governmental effort to protect
and expand overseas corporate activities. Governmental spending, including
mounting expenditures on weapons, infrastructure improvements (including
airport and highway facilities and funds for research and development), an
educational system designed to supply trained personnel for corporations, and a
panoply of government social expenditures to legitimize the federal government
and its activities in the eyes of the poor, has led to a national fiscal crisis. More-
over, the resulting effect of spiraling public sector expenditures in excess of
revenues has aggravated inflation.2 However, although the growing public sector
along with its accompanying tax demands poses a burden on capital formation
and accumulation in the private sector, federal spending nonetheless continues to
underpin the structure of the American political economy.
A power imbalance characterizes the current American economic system.'
Instead of a market system where a large number of small and weak firms prevail
and the competitive model holds sway, a private sector planning system, com-
posed of a small number of large and powerful corporations, which have gained
a measure of independence from the rigors of the competitive ideal, dominates
many American industries. The result is a dual economic system that has spurred
economic concentration. Between 1955 and 1970, the Fortune five hundred
largest industrial corporations increased their share of total private sector em-
ployment, profits and assets from approximately forty percent to seventy
percent.4
These large firms often make concerted attempts to avoid the sudden obso-
lescence of significant portions of investment at the expense of the whole
economy. Giant corporations administer prices through price leadership and a
pricing policy based on a mark-up on costs. Developing behind the growth of
corporations, but facilitated by efforts of the federal government, was the growth
of labor unions to a similar position of power and influence. The pricing policy
2 J. O'CONNOR, THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE STATE (1973).
3 J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE (1973).
4 Miller, Global Corporations and National Stabilization Policy: The Need for Social
Planning, 9 J. EcoN. IssuEs 181, 184 (1975).
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of these firms in the non-competitive sector of the economy and the demands by
unions for higher wages to keep pace with or exceed the cost of living has con-
tributed to inflationary pressures. Moreover, the political sphere is organized so
corporations can function in a predictable environment permitting expansion
and reasonable long-term profits. Large corporations have also strengthened
their power by controlling scientific and technical expertise, channelling the
nation's educational and research activities to meet the needs of business, and
developing methods for gathering, processing, organizing and utilizing informa-
tion. In addition, so as to protect and enlarge their market shares, oligopolistic
firms have relied on advertising and in doing so have played a dominant role in
establishing national values.
The market system enshrines the ideal of consumer sovereignty, namely,
that choices made by individuals in accordance with their tastes will yield ef-
ficiency in the allocation of goods and services. The oligopolist economic system,
however, generates uniformity, not diversity. Preferences are fabricated as
producers create wants by promoting the goods they desire to have consumed.
Billions are spent on advertising to spur consumption and to persuade people
that happiness consists of buying and possessing the latest goods. Production and
consumption are intended to solve the problem of unemployment, but the process
also has the effect of creating quantities of goods which rapidly become obsolete.
Many goods are shabbily produced or perform no significant function.' Comforts
assume the level of needs through ease of availability. Previously unperceived
needs come into being. Hedonism (often with sexual connotations), status and
its prerequisites, personal and family prestige, and the pursuit of gratification
become the underlying rationales supporting capitalism. Pleasure serves the
profit motive. All this creates an illusory freedom which is really a subtle insti-
tutional compulsion.' Freedom is equated with the possession and use of more
commodities, but the techniques of consumer persuasion operate as social controls
to make individuals believe that the status quo is the best of all possible worlds
and that the surfeit of consumer goods can belong to everyone. Individuals are
offered mounting levels of pleasure and security by subjecting themselves to
manipulation.
Consumer goods also create tangible problems in the form of social costs. A
market system beholden to corporate expansion and profits fails to consider the
limits and the physical constraints placed by the ecosystem on continued ex-
ponential growth. Economic growth, in terms of gains in the gross national
product and an expansion of the size of corporations, has become a pervasive
goal for the American economy. Economic growth serves a number of purposes
which include: (1) minimizing the strains that result from continued disparities
5 Id. at 140, 157. See also V. PACKARD, T-E WASTE MAKERS (1963); but compare A.
LINDBECK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEw LEFT: AN OUTSIDER'S VIEW 43 (1971).
Lindbeck cites the fact that a "very large" percentage, perhaps one-third or one-half of the
new products, launched on markets fail and are withdrawn by sponsoring firms within one
year.
6 H. MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN STUDIES IN THE IDEOLOGY OF ADVANCED IN-
DUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1964).
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in wealth and income;7 (2) providing added revenue for governmental ex-
penditures; and (3) acting as a source for individual motivation and social
mobilization. Economic growth also perpetuates the status quo by permitting
the maintenance of the immediate pecuniary interests of favored economic and
social groups.
The market fails, however, to consider the consequences of growth in a
fragile and interconnected world system. A market economy based on a limitless
bounty available for unrestrained exploitation by the private sector creates threats
to the atmosphere and the soil. In addition to environmental deterioration, the
continued depletion of non-renewable raw materials raises the possibility of
resource and energy exhaustion. The productivity of capital invested declines as
increasing amount of capital must be used to extract inaccessible and degraded
resources.' Mounting capital expenditures produce less energy; the capital in-
vested in extractive operations is withdrawn from other sectors of the economy.'
America's response to the problem of controlling economic growth in terms
of the ecosystem has focused on the realization that consumption brings external
diseconomies-social costs-which do not enter into the cost calculations of
private firms. An automobile belching forth emissions, or the litter of bottles and
cans following the use of packaged consumer goods, to give but two examples,
impose costs on the public.' As a pioneering study on social costs noted:
For, if entrepreneurial costs do not measure the total costs of production,
the competitive cost-price calculus is not merely meaningless but nothing
more than an institutionalized cover under which it is possible for private
enterprise to shift part of the costs to the shoulders of others and to practice
a form of large scale spoliation .... 11
7 The income shares of the top 10% and bottom 30% of American family units have
remained constant over a long period of time. G. KOLKO, WEALTH AND POWER IN AMTERICA
(1962). In 1975 families in the lowest 20% of ranking by income received 5.4% of all
income, compared to 5.1% in 1947. The top 20% received 43% in 1947 and 41% in 1975.
Bell, Another Look at Income Distribution, Wall Street Journal, November 12, 1976, at 10,
col. 4. The top 1 or 2% of all family units own about one-third of all wealth, with about
20 to 25% of all wealth in the hands of 0.2% of all family units. R. LAMPMAN, THE SHARE
OF Top WEALTH HOLDERS IN NATIONAL WEALTH, 1925-1956, at 24 (1962). See also Smith &
Franklin, The Concentration of Personnel Wealth 1922-1969, 64 AM. EcoN. REV. 162 (1974);
Crittenden, Mystery of Income Distribution: Economists Want Clearer Data, N.Y. Times,
November 6, 1976, at 29, col. 1.
8 H. ODUM, ENVIRONMENT, POWER AND SOCIETY (1972); Henderson, The End of
Economics, 6 ECOLOGIST 137, 142 (1976).
9 The technical possibilities for using substitute terrestrial resources and recycling new
materials (or even a national policy for controlling resource depletion) face the seemingly
inexorable Second Law of Thermo-dynamics which postulates that all earthly matter and
energy are in a process of degradation, decay, and dispersal. All forms of energy are gradually
transformed into heat which dissipates thereby becoming unavailable for use. See Georgeseu-
Roegen, Energy and Economic Myths, 41 SOUTHERN EcoN. J. 347 (1975). See also N.
GEORGESEu-RoEGEN, THE ENTROPY LAW AND THE ECONOMIC PROCESS (1971).
Recycling involves some loss of a portion of the original raw material(s) through heat
loss. Finally, the danger of thermal pollution may act, in the final instance, as the ultimate
check on limitless vista of economic growth. Energy use generates unusable waste heat.
Estimates indicate that if energy consumption increases approximately 4% annually for the
next century the heat released from the usage of energy will increase the temperature of the
atmosphere by at least one degree centigrade thereby upsetting the global climate. R. HEIL-
BRONER, AN INQUIRY INTO THE HUMAN PROSPECT 50-52 (1974).
10 See Mishan, The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretative Essay, 9 J.
EcON. LIT. 1 (1971); Turvey, On Divergencies Between Social Cost and Private Cost, 30
ECONOMICA 309 (1963). See also Randall, Coasian Externality Theory In a Policy Context,
14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 35 (1974).
11 K. KAPP, THE SOCIAL COSTS OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 233 (1950).
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Social disasters may also result from unchecked atomistic actions. Individual
transactions, which are limited in size, scope and time perspective, fail to recog-
nize the imperatives of interdependence and give rise to consequences extending
beyond the transacting parties themselves. The market fails to calculate total
economic costs. The cumulative result of this sequence of small voluntary choices
is the gradual deforming of society.12
In the absence of universal standards and compliance, self-restraint by any
individual or entity would be unprofitable. To meet environmental risks,
specifically the pollution of air and water resources, the federal government had
to intervene in the market by establishing mandatory standards and assessing
penalties against those who disregard the standards. But as long as continued
economic growth and individual gratification through consumption remain the
watchword of the day, pressures will continue to be exerted against "overly"
strict environmental control measures. Moreover, attempts to achieve effective
and sound regulations are made more difficult because of the competing and
conflicting interests of a complex economic and social system. In effect, it
becomes harder in economic (efficiency) and human terms to get anything
done."
The market also lacks an adequate time perspective to perceive the needs of
future generations in a world of depleting resources. It does not encourage in-
dividuals or corporations to opt for constraint on present resource use for the
benefit of future generations. The profit-orientation of the market fails to provide
a mechanism for producers to take a long-range view by curbing undesirable
practices.
Hazards and unknown risks which follow from technological and scientific
advances also pose problems. The market is unable to translate risk and un-
certainty into a monetary equation.
The market and its accompanying emphasis on efficiency neglects human
and social needs by treating people as things in the production process. The
emergence of managers, who seek the most efficient attainment of high pro-
ductivity, has led to the increasing bureaucratization of work structures and
the specialization of labor. The modern corporation, an over-organized and
over-directed entity headed by a privileged elite, has overlooked an important
factor-the human element. Work has an unpleasant connotation as employees
are increasingly dissatisfied and alienated. A work structure that generates
alienation has important consequences for the quality of a society. This is
compounded by the fact that people feel physically and socially removed from
those who make the economic and political decisions which affect their lives.
The pervasiveness of alienation leads to a withdrawal of identification with and
support for decision-makers. In short the market has failed to consider the
12 See Kahn, The Tyranny of Small Decisions: Market Failures, Imperfections, and the
Limits of Economics, 19 KYKLOS 23 (1966). See also Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons,
162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). Hardin develops the problem in terms of some farmers who realize
they could maximize their advantage by grazing more animals than their neighbors. The local
commons, in which all farmers grazed their flocks in feudal England, was ultimately destroyed
by overgrazing.
13 See, Henderson, supra note 8.
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human and social consequences of technological growth in a modern society. 4
III. Defects in Regulatory and Planning Systems
The regulation of business in its relation to employment, pollution, and
resources, developed from a conviction that an unchecked market system might
lead to abuses. The alternatives of non-interference were deemed worse than
the problems that were anticipated as a result of interference with the market.
But the use of the political process, be it through regulation or all-encompassing
governmental planning, poses a number of problems which include preventing
the takeover of the planning process by corporate interests. This requires a recog-
nition of the necessity to focus on finding satisfactory safeguards before attempt-
ing a politicization of economic decision-making.
Economic planning in a capitalistic system could easily come under the
control of powerful economic interests and dominant societal institutions which
would direct the planning process to promote capital accumulation and corporate
growth. Ample precedent exists for the fear that corporations would attempt to
capture the planning process. Two examples, regulation in the United States and
planning in France, illuminate this suspicion.
Regulatory agencies in the United States have, to varying degrees, become
captives of the firms which the agencies were designed to regulate. Sophisticated
business executives realize that federal regulation of industry may help establish
national markets and contribute to the stabilization of the allocation of resources
and capital, thereby perpetuating the status quo." The rewards of cooperation,
rather than conflict, between big business and regulatory bodies were and are
perceived as a sound strategy. Thus regulation serves as a means by which
established firms cement and perpetuate market positions.
Building on the symbiosis among bureaucrats in the public and private
sectors, corporations perceived the advantages of planning in liaison with gov-
ernment. Planning could facilitate a more effective channeling of public sector
financial assistance, in the form of direct subsidies and indirect tax incentives,
and strengthen the ability of big business to manipulate the goals and the tech-
niques of the American political economy for its own ends.
Post World War II indicative planning in France provides another example
of how corporate interests can control the planning process. In France the
system rested on the existing power relations and authority structures in French
society and thereby reflected the interests of a society dominated by large cor-
porate interests." The planning system in France consisted of long-term fore-
14 Solomon, Toward a Federal Policy on Woik: Restructuring the Governance of Corpo-
rations, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1263 (1975).
15 G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1963).
16 S. COHEN, MODERN CAPITALIST PLANNING: THE FRENCH MODEL (1969); WATSON,
COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF PLANNING PRACTICE IN THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC STATE, IN
PLANNING, POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE BRITISH, FRENCH AND ITALIAN EXPERIENCE
451-54, 474, 477 (J. Hayward & $M. Watson eds. 1975). See also Sheahan, Planning in
France, 18 CHALLENGE 15 (1975). Indicative planners set output targets for the sectors in
which the French economy was divided and interrelated the targets of different industries so
the requisite inputs would be available. This encouraged investments to meet the targets. The
data generated by planning also helps firms predict demand more accurately.
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casts, e.g., the number of automobiles required in five years. The predictions,
coupled with governmental incentives, helped to safely guide corporate decision-
making. French planners bargained for, sought, and received, cooperation from
major industrialists.
The conclusion that should be drawn from these examples is that an analysis
of any proposal for planning should turn on who will do the planning, and what
will be the source of power to enforce the policies formulated. The planning
body ought not be flooded with individuals on leave from corporations or bus-
iness-oriented law firms. In addition, the planning process must avoid the one-
dimensional concepts of modem capitalism, namely, expansion and consumption.
This effort to lessen corporate power, however, encounters the pervasive domi-
nance of private business in setting the goals and values of a capitalistic society.
Even if a public sector body can set and implement goals in a milieu of a
lessened complicity with major business executives, a popular horror exists of
rigid economic, social and political planning on a national level. The specter of
the central government detailing to the last pin what each factory will produce
and what each individual will consume engenders a fear of compulsion, regimen-
tation and red tape. A hierarchical political administrative apparatus based on
obedience and subordination will likely create a new political elite. The ensuing
bureaucratization of society perpetuates citizen passivity as directions emanate
from a few planning experts.
Some theorists view planning and the concomitant concentration of political
and economic power, especially in conjunction with an extensive program of
nationalization of industry, as inevitably leading to a totalitarian nightmare.
Hayek states: "[P]lanning leads to dictatorship because dictatorship is the most
effective instrument of coercion and enforcement of ideals and, as such, is essen-
tial if central planning on a large scale is to be possible."17 The clash between
planning and democracy is inevitable. It is argued that in contrast to planners
who impose values on others and thereby reduce individual freedom and choice,
a significant private sector constrains the ambitions of bureaucrats and the
power of government, thereby preserving individual freedoms.18
The argument rests on the meaning of freedom and choice, both of which
may be illusory in a corporate-oriented economy. A considerable portion of the
current choosing in the so-called free market is of empty significance. Instead
of an unbridled freedom for the entrepreneur or the bureaucratic manager of a
large business entity, or increased income and wealth for the few, or mass pro-
duction and consumption, freedom may become multi-faceted and include social
and psychological dimensions. Furthermore, since society and the individual are
intertwined, an autonomous individual cannot, by his or her own actions, achieve
"freedom" in isolation from a social environment. Private individual decisions,
in consumption, housing, transportation and recreation, among others, carry with
them far-reaching social consequences. Collective action is necessary to maintain
17 F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 70 (1962).
18 Id. Milton Friedman states the case for capitalism as follows, "I know of no example
in time or place of a society that has been marked by a large measure of political fredom, and
that has not also used something comparable to a free market to organize the bulk of economic
activity." M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 9 (1962). But compare K. POLANYI, THE
GREAT TRANSFORMATION, THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (1944).
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the operation of the economy and the ecosystem. Collective decision-making,
which subordinates individual economic aspirations to social goals, may expand
individual opportunities for self-fulfillment in a context beyond private capital
accumulation and conspicuous consumption.
Privileged individuals may resent that planning opens the possibility for a
more equitable division of income, wealth, security and leisure. Opponents of
economic levelling argue that economic incentives motivate people to work and
thereby benefit society as a whole. But must society continue to rely on tradi-
tional economic incentives? Would not the extension of opportunities to a wider
base of the populace and a reduction in the disparities in wealth and income
levels enable more individuals to realize their potential and create the possibility
for more viable communities? In short, consideration of a planning process in-
volves sensitivity to the problem of "freedom," the development and acceptance
of new goals and values for both individuals and society, and the creation of in-
stitutions, i.e., the means for achieving such ends.
Further important contextual elements of the planning process are the
recognition of global interdependency and the transnational dimensions of the
environmental, climate, and resources problems. Markets for goods, services and
investments are no longer confined within a nation-state. Multinational corpo-
rations, which have gone beyond the bounds of national markets, dominate the
world economy. A Eurocurrency market, a pool of deposits in excess of $100
billion, exists outside national banking regulations. However, no global central
bank as a lender of last resort exists to stem a future crisis in the Eurocurrency
market.
The multinational corporations as a global system weaken the ability of any
nation to pursue unilaterally its policy objectives. Intracorporate transactions
among a parent and its subsidiaries bypass and negate the market. Global firms
use foreign subsidiaries to evade national regulatory procedures, and earnings
can be shifted to reduce corporate taxes. Foreign borrowings by multinational
firms may circumvent restrictive national monetary policies. National money
and capital markets are more closely intertwined, rendering more difficult the
efforts of any one nation-state to stabilize domestic activity. Multinational busi-
ness leads to a synchronization of national economic fluctuations. Efforts by any
one nation to improve its regulatory mechanisms may lead multinational firms
to locate profit centers in less restrictive nations. The internationalization of busi-
ness and the subordination of nations to the workings of a transnational economic
order forces planning to assume an international context.
However, recommendations for an international agency to serve, for
instance, as a global environmental regulator, 9 encounter the following problems:
the barrier of national sovereignty; one inherent ineffectiveness of world organ-
19 See Kennan, To Prevent a World Wasteland: A Proposal, 48 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 446
(1970); but compare Bleicher, An Overview of International Environmental Regulation, 2
ECOLOGY L. Q. 1 (1974); Fleischer, An International Convention on Environment Cooperation
Among Nations: Proposed Draft, Policies and Goals, 7 TEXAs INT'L L. J. 73 (1975). Recom-
mendations emanating from the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
are summarized in, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 533, 537-38 (1974). For a proposed international
ethic review board to handle genetic engineering issues see Note, The Potential for Genetic
Engineering: A Proposal for International Legal Control, 16 VA. J.I.L. 403 (1976).
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izations generally, e.g., the United Nations; and the difficulty of devising an
adequate and effective sanctioning mechanism. In addition, a central world,,,ide
authority, with coercive sanction powers, would constitute the ultimate elitistic-
totalitarian arrangement. Furthermore, questions arise as to the numoer of
decisions a single transnational center can make and enforce. Indeed, a global
political structure might prove unwieldy. Nonetheless, given a continuation of
the present nation-state system, a need exists for some mechanism to at least co-
ordinate national policies, even among national planning systems.
IV. Towards a Theory of a Participatory Society
The traditional American pattern of inefficient political intervention in fine-
tuning the market rests on a disjointed process of muddling through." The
haphazard administrative-political process, lacking long-range objectives, adopts
piecemeal, incremental policies which depart only slightly from past and existing
policies and institutions. In contrast, a concept of comprehensive social planning
rests on the notion that social forces previously thought uncontrollable can be
understood and mastered. Acknowledging society's limited ability to foresee the
future, and bearing in mind the difficulty of fixing precise blueprints for future
vicissitudes, the formulation of social policy involves a four-step process: (1)
understanding the current situation and its causes; (2) delineating desired goals
in light of the people they will affect; (3) comparing the current situation with
the goals; and (4) preparing a strategy to achieve the implementation of the
goals. As part of the social planning process, three additional questions must be
considered: (1) who will formulate the goals being devised; (2) who will sup-
port or oppose these goals, and what will be their reasons for so doing; and (3)
what would be the impact of alternative proposals on the participants?
It is necessary to set forth the basis for a new set of values, a hierarchy of
human needs which culminate in self-actualization. These value judgments aim
at the creation of a society which will provide an adequate material base for
all by meeting the nutritional, housing, clothing, health-care, and educational
needs of the population. Achieving these goals will necessitate an institutional
restructuring within the present federal political system and a far-reaching de-
centralization of economic and political institutions.
The suggested value orientation put forth here, builds upon the theories of
Abraham Maslow, who conceptualized a hierarchical theory of human motiva-
tion. Maslow's hierarchy starts at the lowest physiological level and culminates
with human self-actualization. Self-actualization encompasses a person's desire
to achieve his or her potential and is characterized by a superior perception of
reality, increased acceptance of self, of others, and of nature. It seeks after
spontaneity, autonomy, appreciation, richness of emotional reaction, improved
interpersonal relations, and increased creativity. 21 The unfolding self-realization,
20 From an analysis of disjointed incrementalism see Lindblom, The Science of Muddling
Through, 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959).
21 A. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY (2d ed. 1970). This theme is developed
at greater length in Solomon, Toward a Federal Policy on Work: Restructuring the Governance
of Corporation, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1263, 1264-72 (1975); but compare R. HEILBRONER,
AN INQUIRY INTO THE HUMAN PROSPECT (1974).
(April 1977]
[Vol. 52:624] TOWARDS A THEORY OF A PARTICIPATORY SOCIETY 633
Maslow posited, produces creative and beneficial results for both the individual
and society.
Maslow's model of human personality raises several questions. First, it is
uncertain whether institutional arrangements which enable every individual to
pursue his or her self-interest will thereby benefit everyone else. Is it possible to
reconcile the individual and the community? Second, the premise of abundance
underlies the new society. As Maslow states: "When we are healthy enough
to perceive the higher unity, when the world is good enough and wealthy enough
so that there is no scarcity, then we can see that our interests as human beings
are pooled and that what benefits one person benefits me, or benefits anybody
else for that matter . . .," However, in a finite world of limited resources,
scarcity looms as a disturbing reality. Exponential growth based on the depletion
of non-renewable resources and on environmental pollution can no longer form
the basis by which an individual may realize self-potential without depriving
others of the ability to realize their potential. Attainment of socially responsible
growth patterns thus requires a transformation from the materialism which
presently predominates to another basis of values.
Attempting to bridge the gap between the dynamic psychology of in-
dividuals and the impact of society, especially economic institutions, Erich Fromm
developed the concept of social character. Social character is a syndrome of
character traits emanating from an adaptation to common economic, social and
cultural conditions, which mediate the transformation within an individual of
general psychic energy into the specific psychic energy needed by a society for
its own functioning and preservation." For example, since the Great Depression
society has encouraged individuals, except the very poor, to spend money on and
consume new products. A premium of satisfaction is given to those who act as
they are supposed to act, i.e., by spending and consuming. However, the im-
possibility of continuing exponential growth may lay the basis for another shift
in the social character. Material needs may become by necessity more easily
satisfied, enabling human energy to be channeled into other, hopefully more
constructive, outlets.
Three obstacles may block the development of a new value system, which
would aid people in dealing with the realization that the economy cannot grow
indefinitely. First, it is far from certain that people will abandon the current
pattern of consumption as a means of overcoming the boredom inherent in an
individual society. 4 Although more people may become satiated with consump-
tion, an economic system based on growth and expansion will create new items
to serve as future status symbols. It may be unlikely that the American public
would be content with a minimum level of food, clothing, adequate but mini-
mum health care, and transportation. But continued dependence on scarce and
increasingly expensive resources and energy may lead to a reorientation of value
away from growth, efficiency, power and profit.
22 A. MASLOW, EUPSYCHIAN MANAGEMENT 96 (1965).
23 E. FROMM & M. MACCOBY, SOCIAL CHARACTER IN A MEXICAN VILLAGE 18-23, 230-36
(1970). See also Fromm, Psychoanalytic Characterology and Its Significance for Social
Psychology, in E. FROMM, THE CRISIS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (1970).
24 E. FROMM, THE REVOLUTION OF HOPE 124 (1968); E. FROMM, THE ANATOMY OF
HUMAN DESTRUCTIVENESS 242-51 (1973).
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Secondly, individuals also differ in the degree of freedom and responsibility
they seek in economic and political organizations. Some individuals, preferring
to be dependent, do not desire to maks up their own minds. They want safe,
highly structured positions where supervisors direct them. Another group,
authoritarian in its outlook, wishes to dominate other individuals. 5 These varying
strains of human personalities and motivations would likely block a value con-
sensus on the implementation of a course of action governing the distribution of
wealth and income.
Third, social character builds on existing socio-economic conditions, and on
the ideologies, customs and methods of child-rearing. The social character of
parents and educational methodology mold the social character of children.
Thus, the formation of a new social character, particularly aimed at full human
development, may lag behind the requirements of the ecosystem.
But even if values shift and consumption is lessened, institutions must also
be adjusted to permit greater participation by individuals in decisions affecting
their lives. The rationale for increased participation, that is, giving individuals
control over the decision-making and planning process, stems from several
desires: (1) to promote a heightened sense of social and political efficacy by
lessening the sense of powerlessness, that is, the feeling that the individual has
lost control over his life; (2) to provide for greater governmental responsiveness;
and (3) to lessen the extent that a society is beholden to experts.
Assuming a continuation of the present federal structure, based on the con-
cept of representation, several possibilities exist to promote increased public in-
volvement in and control over public sector institutions. More extensive use
could be made of binding and advising referenda. To initiate far-reaching public
discussion, a federal information agency could put forward alternative policy
options in light of different objectives, values and perceptions of problems. If
various sides responded to each other's position and clarify the underlying
assumptions, such discussion could further promote public understanding of
available options. The danger exists, however, that the public, sinking in a
morass of data, could become convinced that it lacks the qualifications to judge
which parade of experts is right and may opt to avoid all risks by opposing all
action.
Other mechanisms could be developed for people to participate in policy
formulation. Extensive use could be made of the computer, particularly if home
terminals become economically feasible. The individual could also become more
active in city and state agencies as well as community and neighborhood planning
groups. Given time for experience to develop, local democratic planning seems
within the capacity of citizens. But how will citizen experience and community
involvement on a local level be translated into national planning? Citizens might
work with local and national planning groups and agencies for limited periods,
for example, two to four weeks. Ideally, national plans could build upon and
integrate local plans so that priorities established at community levels could be
reflected in national plans.
25 E. FROA11f, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM (1941); A. MASLOW, EUPSYCHIAN MANAGEMENT
22-23, 27, 31-35, 42-43, 54, 185 (1965).
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The development of renewable alternate energy sources, such as solar and
wind power, can open possibilities for smaller, decentralized, more comprehensive
economic and political units. Energy and technology, smaller in scale, could
form the basis for new communities meeting human needs in a variety of ways.
Smaller economic and political units would enable worker-citizens, non-experts,
to be more informed and assume a greater degree of responsibility in economic
and political institutions. People could regain power over aspects of everyday
life, aiding in the development of realization and sense of community.
A large nation, such as the United States, could be subdivided into de-
centralized regions with different values paramount in various regions. Such a
system would handle diversity in tastes and choices among individuals and
groups. Subdivision into smaller units could promote participation. Regional
units, generally larger than cities or states because of the existence of problems
too large for solution on a local level, could lead to a community of interest
emphasizing quality of existence for all. Regions could tailor production to
locally available supplies of energy, food, and other life-sustaining resources.
Units could produce and consume most of the required agricultural and man-
ufactured goods. Society could provide for transition to phase out certain pro-
duction processes and retain and resettle individuals formerly engaged in the
consumption-oriented, resource and capital-intensive process.2"
A program of decentralization encounters a series of other obstacles.
Autonomous political units, in the absence of central directives, may, for ex-
ample, produce wasteful products which threaten the earth's environment. A
mechanism must be developed to handle the unwanted side effects created by
regional units. Decisions, if made at too low a level, may be duplicative or in-
compatible. Given the disparities in the control over resources and energy
sources, rivalries may develop between regions. The struggle for resources and
energy will require a linking together of the regional units under a central co-
ordinating system which would provide certain services, such as defense and
transportation, and resolve conflicts among the units.
The benefits to be derived from participation must also be assessed. The
repeated discussion of "small" issues may not result in a creative and efficient
process. The interest and span of attention of individuals is likely to lessen 7 as
the novelty of participation decreases. Inability to make decisions, particularly
26 J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE 289-390, 318 (1973).
If, however, the possibility for meaningful participation within the present federal political
structure proves futile, what limits can be placed on experts in the planning and decision-
making process, and how may the American political system be made more responsive to
human needs? On the assumption that, in a representative form of government, the legislature
best reflects broad public sentiment and the "public interest," Congress could take the
initiative in delineating specific policy such as the direction of future growth. Specific ob-
jectives could be established before authority and funds are delegated to an administrative
agency. A "Congressional Committee on National Priorities," with an overall view of the
problem, could attempt to assess the relative importance of contending claims on the Gross
National Product and promote a long-term coordinated program of federal intervention.
Congress could more closely supervise and coordinate the federal regulatory and/or planning
mechanism than it now does. Extensive congressional involvement might lessen the vulner-
ability of the planning mechanism to domination by business interest, and make the planning
process more accountable. However, it is necessary to guard against the possibility that policy
could be set by log rolling with only limited participation.
27 B. MOORE, JR., REFLECTIONS ON THE CAUSES OF HUMAN MISERY AND UPON CERTAIN
PROPOSALS TO ELIMINATE THEM 73-75 (1972).
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on distribution questions, may destroy participatory structures or at least create
obstacles to the achievement of speedy decisions. In a non-homogeneous com-
munity, participation may highlight differences and increase conflict. As a result,
speculators and traders, who seek personal gain by operating in the interstices of
the economic and political system, may flourish. Finally, within each community
or region, an elite group may perpetuate itself. The "Iron Law of Oligarchy"' 8
rests on the need to develop authority in large groups, creating a gulf between the
leaders and the masses. Elitist theorists posit that every institution develops an
oligarchy because the rank-and-file, through incompetence and apathy, cannot
and do not desire involvement in decision-making. From the mass springs a
minority which raises itself to the rank of a governing class that is elitist by
virtue of education, cultural superiority, and lust for power. The end result is
that a minority of leaders dominate a majority of directed people, in a condition
of tutelage.
The response to this attack turns on a new value orientation. Individuals
looking to both self-fulfillment and a concern for others may create and operate
institutions so as to meet the challenge of a new social era. Instead of a narcissistic
vision of personal growth, a consensus may develop that individual development
can only occur within a social context. Diffusing economic, political and social
power through participation may focus on distributional questions, specifically
a limitation on income levels and wealth holdings. 9 Establishment of a fixed
ratio between highest and lowest salaries paid by an enterprise, subject to the
assurance that all persons receive a minimal share, may facilitate citizen involve-
ment. Setting a salary ratio on a plant or company basis, however, may present
inequities beyond the control of workers such as the size and level of tech-
nological development of a plant or company, the availability of raw materials,
or the position of a firm in an industry.
To reduce deadweight bureaucracy, Yugoslavia, within the context of
worker managed enterprises and political decentralization, turned to reliance
upon the market to make a number of resource allocation decisions." The
utility of a market lies in relating a number of autonomous production units
and overcoming the difficulties of collecting and coordinating data on consumer
preferences, price decisions and production processes involving millions of com-
modities. The market and profit system also provide incentives to avoid waste
and increase productivity. But the direction and content interchanges of infor-
mation between the planning center and the decentralized enterprises in Yugo-
slavia remain unclear.
Combining a market and planning system with government control over
investment, while striving to attain humanistic values within the community,
raises several problems. The market may promote efficiency in the production
of goods for consumption at the expense of a humanized work process. Workers
28 R. MICHAELS, POLITICAL PARTIES (1949).
29 John Rawls has advanced a theory calling for an equal distribution of income, power
and status unless unequal distribution furthers the common welfare by satisfying compensatory
principles of distributive justice. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); Rawls, Some
Reasons for the Maximum Criterion, 64 A.s. EcoN. REV. 141 (1974).
30 D. MILENKOVITCH, PLAN AND MARKET IN YUGOSLAV ECONoMIc THOUGHT (1971).
See generally YUGOSLAV WORKERS' SELF-MANAGEMENT (M. Broekmeyer ed. 1970).
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in one firm may desire higher income with less work satisfaction thereby forcing
other firms to follow suit. Redistributional policies and the equalizing of effi-
cient and inefficient enterprises may lessen the invidious effects of the market
that now result in the areas of wealth, status, and power. Nevertheless, workers
will still be subject to impersonal market forces and the reappearance of hier-
archical institutions. Therefore, despite increased attention to alternative owner-
ship structures, e.g., consumer cooperatives owned by public sector and em-
ployees, there is the possibility that the market calculations will probably threaten
to counteract the values sought, i.e., community orientation and the full develop-
ment of individuals who are not alienated, status-minded,3 ' or subordinated to
authority.
V. Conclusion
No definitive or final solution exists to the range of problems that have
been considered. These questions cannot be solved by either an autonomous
market mechanism, that is linked to private enterprise and resurgent individual-
ism, or by centralized planning systems based on public ownership. However, an
urgent need exists to reorient values and to create institutions to foster a political-
economic systen which may more adequately serve both present and long-range
human needs. This article has sought to encourage a rethinking of such difficult
social questions, including the assumptions which underlie a society whose life is
based on consumption and technology.
Within large nations such as the United States different conditions among
various industries and locations, particularly structural unemployment caused by
the migration of industry and variations in employment, require select policy
tools for particular regions. For example, a tax rebate or reduction may not
reduce employment in economically depressed areas, and could add to inflation-
ary pressures in boom regions. 2 Furthermore, rather than stressing the need for
the economy to grow, attention should focus on the quality of growth, which
should be sought only where it is necessary and desirable. Within the present
economic and political structure, the federal government could allocate resources
to industries which are labor-intensive, and which are geared to conserving
declining resources through the use of renewable and recyclable resources. In a
world of rapid change, flexible policies are needed which can maximize options
and increase the ability to tap different resources to meet unforeseen develop-
ments.
31 See Roosevelt, Market Socialism: A Humane Economy? 3 J. EcoN. IssuEs (1969);
but compare Quattro, Market Socialism and Socialistic Values, 7 REV. RAD. POL. ECON. 76
(1975). On the role of the market in a planning system see 0. LANGE, ON THE ECONOMIC
THEORY OF SOCIALISM (1938); 0. LANGE, PAPERS IN ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY (P. Knights-
field trans. ed. 1970); B. HORVAT, TOWARDS A THEORY OF PLANNED ECONOMY (1964);
Horvat, An Institutional Model of a Self-Managed Socialist Economy, in 2 SELF-GOVERNING
SOCIALISM (B. Horvat, M. Markovic, & R. Supek eds. 1975); Spulber, On Some Issues in the
Theory of the Socialist Economy, 25 KyxLos 715 (1972).
32 A. TOFFLER, THE Eco-SPASM REPORT 94 (1975).
